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ABSTRACT
The Netherlands witnessed an unprecedented drop in the number of hours worked per worker during 
the first wave, up to -18% in May according to the LISS panel. During the months May-September hours 
worked have recovered to some extent. The drop in employment in persons was more modest, -2.2% by 
May, which has since rebounded to -1.2% in October. The massive expansion of short-time work is likely 
to have played an important role in keeping employment in persons up, peaking at 36% of employees in 
March-May and dropping back to 18% of employees in June-August. Initially, speed was of the essence, 
and the targeting of the policies was limited. After the Summer, policies have become more targeted, 
and incentives for output and reallocation have been improved.
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Labor market impact of COVID-19
The latest data from Statistics Netherlands shows a partial recovery after an initial 
substantial drop in employed persons (Figure 1 left). During the first wave, the reduction was 
limited to -17 thousand persons in March, then increased to -160 thousand persons in April, 
and dropped back to -24 thousand persons in May. After the gradual lifting of restrictive 
measures, the number of employed persons recovered partially in June (+45 thousand 
persons) and in July and August (both +4 thousand persons). Since the start of the second 
wave, the number of employed persons first dropped by 3 thousand persons in September, 
followed by a somewhat surprising increase of 40 thousand persons in October. So far the 
crisis has led to a cumulative reduction of -111 thousand persons since the start of COVID-19 
pandemic (-1.2%), particularly among workers with a fixed-term contract (Figure 1 right).
Until May, the increase in unemployment was moderate, up to 56 thousand persons 
between February and May, due in part to a reduction in the labor force participation rate, 
from 71.4% in February to 70.2% in May.1 By now, though, the labor force participation rate 
has almost fully recovered (71.3%) and the number of unemployed persons has increased 
substantially: from 274 thousand persons in February to 406 thousand in October (+48%).2 
Figure 1: Employment in persons by type of employment
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Figure 1 Employment in persons by type of employment 
  
Source: Statistics Netherlands. 
  
 
1 For other labor market developments in the Netherlands, see CPB (2020a) and CPB (2020b). 
2 The unemployment rate increased from 2.9% in February to 4.3% in October. In between, the unemployment 
rate peaked at 4.6% in August. 
Source: Statistics Netherlands.
The large drop in employed persons during April and May was preceded by an unprecedented 
drop in hours worked per week, which we already observed in March. After the lockdown 
mid-March, hours worked per week dropped by 12% (-4 hours), and dropped a little 
further by 2% in April (-0.7 hours) (Figure 2 left). In May the number of hours worked 
continued to fall by another 4% (-1.3 hour).3 The drop in the total number of hours worked 
was especially large in p ivat  rvices (Figu e 2 right). Afte  th  first wave, we saw a slight 
recovery in hours worked equal to 3% in June (1 hour). This is no coincidence because June 
marked the beginning of some substantial alleviations of the lockdown. The number of 
hours worked remained at approximately the same level in September.4 The figures also 
show a substantial return of working from home towards working at the workplace. The 
Dutch government therefore made an urgent appeal to everyone to work from home as 
much as possible at the beginning of October.
1 For other labor market developments in the Netherlands, see CPB (2020a) and CPB (2020b).
2 The unemployment rate increased from 2.9% in February to 4.3% in October. In between, the unemployment rate peaked at 
4.6% in August.
3 The figures in the left panel of Figure 2 are slightly different from the September country report. This is because the sample of 
persons who completed the survey for the months March-September is somewhat different from the sample of persons who 
completed the survey for the months March-June.
4 No survey was conducted for the months July and August.
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Figure 2: Hours worked per week and total hours by sector
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(Figure 2 left). In May the number of hours worked continued to fall by another 4% (-1.3 hour).3 The 
drop in the total number of hours worked was especially large in private services (Figure 2 right). After 
the first wave, we saw a slight recovery in hours worked equal to 3% in June (1 hour). This is no 
coincidence because June marked the beginning of some substantial alleviations of the lockdown. The 
number of hours worked remained at approximately the same level in September.4 The figures also 
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the beginning of October. 
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Source: Von Gaudecker et al. (2020) (left) and Statistics Netherlands (right). 
  
 
3 The figures in the left panel of Figure 2 are slightly different from the September country report. This is because 
the sample of persons who completed the survey for the months March-September is somewhat different from the 
sample of persons who completed the survey for the months March-June. 
4 No survey was conducted for the months July and August. 
Source: Von Gaudecker et al. (2020) (left) and Statistics Netherlands (right).
Orientation and targeting of adopted measures
In March-May, 139 thousand firms with in total 2.7 million employees (36% of all employees 
in the Netherlands) claimed short-time work subsidies (NOW, Tijdelijke Noodmaatregel 
Overbrugging voor Werkgelegenheid).5 In June-August this figure dropped to 63 thousand 
firms with in total 1.3 million employees (18% of all employees).6 Firms that have a drop in 
sales of more than 20% can get a subsidy of 90% of the wage bill that corresponds with the 
drop in sales. As a result, the Dutch government has supported firms with an amount of 9.9 
billion euro in March-May and 5.3 billion euro in June-August. Furthermore, it is estimated 
that around 374 thousand self-employed (25% of all self-employed in the Netherlands) 
have claimed a special form of welfare from municipalities in March-May (Tozo, Tijdelijke 
overbruggingsregeling zelfstandig ondernemers), which dropped to 103 thousand in June-
August (7% of all self-employed).7 The first part (March-May) of this special form of 
welfare did not depend on partner income or wealth, whereas the second part (June-
August) did involve a partner income test. Additionally, the government has granted firms 
tax deferrals (for a total of 13 billion euro by the end of August8) and provided a lump sum 
transfer for ‘flexible’ workers that lost a substantial part of their income but did not have 
access to unemployment insurance or welfare (TOFA, Tijdelijke overbruggingsregeling voor 
flexibele arbeidskrachten). The use of this latter scheme was however rather limited (10 
thousand persons receiving 17 million euro).
The focus of the Dutch government with the NOW and Tozo was on getting support to 
firms and workers quickly. This has kept individuals out of unemployment, at least for the 
time being. This is generally considered to have been a timely and successful initial policy 
response.9 At the end of August both schemes (NOW and Tozo) have been renewed for another 
3 quarters until July 1st 2021, although the terms have changed somewhat: the NOW-subsidy 
5 For an overview of all financial policy measures in the Netherlands related to COVID-19, see: https://www.rijksoverheid.nl/
onderwerpen/coronavirus-financiele-regelingen/overzicht-financiele-regelingen.
6 Source: Ministry of Social Affairs and Employment (2020).




9 According to survey results from the end of March reported in Von Gaudecker et al. (2020), only about 10% of employees was 
worried about their job in the next 4 weeks, in part due to the special policies to maintain employment, whereas about 30% of 
self-employed was worried about losing their work.
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on the wage bill will be gradually reduced from 90% to 60% while the minimum required 
loss in turnover will be increased from 20% to 30% as of January 1, 2021. The Tozo was 
intended to become subject to a wealth test as of October 1, but this is postponed to April 
2021 due to the second partial lockdown. The adjustments to the original schemes are aimed 
to make the support more targeted, and to mitigate adverse incentives for reallocation and 
working hours.10 The government has also made a budget available to support retraining and 
job-to-job transitions for individuals in affected sectors.
Immediate liquidity support to businesses
As noted above, at the peak of the crisis some 25% of self-employed have claimed the 
special welfare benefits (Tozo), which runs through the municipalities. Self-employed 
can claim the special welfare benefits from March, actual transfers have started in April. 
The government chose for quick delivery in the first installment of the Tozo, which was 
independent of wealth and partner income. There is no information on the extent to which 
these measures have mitigated the economic impact of COVID-19 on self-employed yet. 
The Tozo-scheme has been recently extended until July 1st 2021, though this renewed 
scheme is now subject to a partner income test and will be subject to a wealth test as of 
April 2021.
Small firms can also use the NOW for their employees, see also above. In addition, 
in selected sectors that are hit particularly hard, firms could get a one-time subsidy of 4 
thousand euro (TOGS) to cover the fixed costs. In early June, about 200 thousand firms 
received the TOGS. This amounts to a total financial support of 800 million euro (Ministry 
of Economic Affairs and Climate Policy, 2020). Again, speed was considered to be of the 
essence.11 The TOGS was succeeded by the TVL in June, which also provides financial 
support for small to medium sized firms (<250 employees) in hard-hit sectors. The size 
of the TVL subsidy depends on the individual turnover loss as well as the share fixed costs 
of the sector. Furthermore, all firms can delay paying their taxes and many firms can 
also delay payments on their loans. There is no information on the extent to which these 
measures have mitigated the economic impact of COVID-19 on small firms yet.
Support of dependent workers
So far we have witnessed a substantial decline in employment in persons, though the 
decline up to and including April (and May) was quite limited compared to other western 
countries (CPB, 2020b), and has even recovered somewhat in the last months. This is 
generally considered to be related to the special policy measures taken, including financial 
support for short-time work12, which initially also contained a penalty on dismissals, 
and financial support for the self-employed. This is typically not being complemented by 
sectoral or firm-level agreements, although specific support for specific firms is sometimes 
conditional on wage cuts (the support for Air France – KLM for example).
10 Indeed, e.g. Cahuc (2019) and Krugman (2020) note that short-time work arrangements like the NOW work best for a short-
lived V-shape recession, but inefficiencies due to reduced reallocation will increase as the recession is more likely be U-, L- or 
‘Nike-swoosh’-shaped.
11 This policy measure has since been closed.
12 This is consistent with the evidence presented in Cahuc et al. (2018) and Giupponi and Landais (2020) for the short-run effects 
of short-time work policies in France and Italy, respectively, during the Great Recession.
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Working conditions and work organization
In general, there has been a large shift in hours worked at the workplace and hours 
worked from home. The drop in hours worked was most pronounced in sectors where 
there is limited opportunity to work from home, like the catering sector, the culture and 
entertainment sector and the retail sector (see the May country report for the Netherlands). 
In the business, financial and public services sectors and the education sector there has been 
a limited drop in hours worked, due to a large shift to working from home.13 As expected, 
the drop in hours is much less pronounced for ‘essential workers’ like doctors, nurses, 
teachers, policemen and -women, military personnel, people that work in transportation, 
media or supermarkets (see the May country report for the Netherlands). Several sectors 
have witnessed a large increase in demand, like supermarkets, online shops and delivery 
services.
Research provides a mixed picture of the effects of the corona crisis on gender 
inequality in the Netherlands (Yerkes et al., 2020). On the one hand, more fathers than 
mothers take on additional care responsibilities (22% versus 12%), which seems to be 
related to the fact that women are overrepresented in crucial professions. On the other 
hand, more mothers than fathers have less free time (57% versus 36%) and experience 
more work pressure (39% versus 31%).
Some firms had to shut down business temporarily because of outbreaks of COVID-19, 
in particular the meatpacking industry, which employs many migrant workers which live 
in close quarters and travelled to work packed in small buses.14
New labor market entrants
Previous research has shown that vocational and academic graduates in the Netherlands 
did suffer in terms of wages for 6 to 8 years after graduating, and to a lesser extent in 
the employment probability, when graduating during a recession.15 Given the social 
distancing measures and overall decline in labor demand (vacancies have plummeted 
after the lockdown16), things look pretty dim for new labor market entrants. To the best of 
our knowledge there are no (sizeable) policy innovations and initiatives related to hiring 
of new labor market entrants or the provision of apprenticeships (these have been largely 
postponed for vocational education in sectors that significantly reduced their activities 
due to the COVID-19 pandemic and the resulting social distancing rules).17 There has been 
some relaxation of study progress requirements, where students in lower- and higher 
vocational training do not have to fulfill the requirement to obtain a particular number of 
study points.18 However, the rules for university students remain unchanged, motivated 
by the observation that they often do not have to do an internship to meet the study 
requirements.
13 See the May country report for the Netherlands for worked hours at the workplace and at home by sector.
14 See: https://nos.nl/artikel/2334580-vleesindustrie-blijkt-coronahaard-bonden-en-werkgevers-willen-testen-en-controles.html.
15 See: Van den Berge (2018).
16 By the end of March, vacancies had dropped by 21% (CBS Netherlands, https://www.rijksoverheid.nl/onderwerpen/
coronavirus-covid-19/ouders-scholieren-en-studenten-kinderopvang-en-onderwijs).
17 Information for students is available here (https://www.rijksoverheid.nl/onderwerpen/coronavirus-covid-19/ouders-
scholieren-en-studenten-kinderopvang-en-onderwijs).
18 See: https://www.nu.nl/coronavirus/6089771/hogescholen-geven-eerstejaars-ook-dit-jaar-geen-bindend-studieadvies.html
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Policy innovations and labor market trends
The response of the government during this unprecedented crisis has also been 
unprecedented in terms of the speed and breadth of the interventions. Perhaps as a result, 
the consequences for employment in persons in the affected sectors and other sectors 
so far appear relatively mild, from an international perspective and also given the steep 
drop in production. This could be considered remarkable. We are still in the midst of the 
pandemic, so it remains hard to speculate about the aftermath. Hence, it is hard to identify 
changes in medium- and or long-term trends, which will also depend on the length of 
the crisis. However, it is not unreasonable to assume that we will see an acceleration in 
working from home and a more rapid adoption of technologies to collaborate and work 
online. Furthermore, online shops are likely to get a boost, as they did in Asia after the 2003 
outbreak of SARS.19 Furthermore, at least for the medium run, we may expect reshoring of 
certain activities and a drop in international labor mobility. Even more difficult to gauge are 
the long-term effects. An optimistic view is that this was a prototypical external shock, not 
due to an imbalance in the system, which suggests that we may return to the growth path 
from before the COVID-19 pandemic eventually.20
Next steps and fiscal viability
The most recent economic outlook of CPB (2020c) revealed that the shock to public finances 
due to the crisis and the special policies will remain bearable in the Netherlands, even in 
the most severe scenario. The gross government debt increases very sharply in the base 
scenario though, from 49% of GDP in 2019 to 60% in 2020 and 62% in 2021. Also in the 
scenario where we have a weaker recovery than in the base scenario and in a scenario with 
a second contamination wave, gross government debt is expected to remain sustainable, at 
a debt level of 72% of GDP in 2021.
However, it is now clear that this is not a V-shaped recession, but more likely to be a 
‘Nike-swoosh’ or W-shaped recession. This is because at least part of the social distancing 
policies will remain in effect until a vaccine or cure arrives, and a second wave is gaining 
momentum in Europe. Hence, a reallocation of workers from firms and sectors that are 
shrinking to other firms and sectors seems inevitable. Hence, we should protect workers, 
but at the same time provide sufficient incentives and possibilities for workers to relocate 
to where they are the most productive. In this process we also have to make sure that there 
is not an excessive loss of firm- and sector-specific capital in the process of scaling down, 
and scaling up once the vaccine or cure arrives.21, 22
19 See: https://www.cnbc.com/2020/03/26/chinas-2002-2003-sars-outbreak-helped-alibaba-become-e-commerce-giant.html.
20 See: Krugman (2020).
21 See also Blanchard et al. (2020) and Jongen and Koning (2020).
22 The projected recession has also fueled the debate about the rather strict employment protection of workers with a permanent 
contract combined with limited restrictions for the use of ‘flexible’ contracts, where ‘flexible’ workers typically have limited 
insurance but sometimes special tax deductions (self-employed), which may be one of the reasons why the share of flexible 
work in the Netherlands is relatively high from an international perspective. This was already high on the agenda following the 
report of the Committee for the Regulation of Work (Commissie Regulering van Werk) published in January 2020. (https://
www.reguleringvanwerk.nl/) 
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